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ABSTRACT 
Understanding the evolution of sociality in humans and other species requires 
understanding how selection on social behaviour varies with group size. 
However, the effects of group size are frequently obscured in the theoretical 
literature, which often makes assumptions that are at odds with empirical 
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findings. In particular, mechanisms are suggested as supporting large-scale 
cooperation when they would in fact rapidly become ineffective with increasing 
group size. Here we review the literature on the evolution of helping behaviours 
(cooperation and altruism), and frame it using a simple synthetic model that 
allows us to delineate how the three main components of the selection pressure 
on helping must vary with increasing group size. The first component is the 
marginal benefit of helping to group members, which determines both direct 
fitness benefits to the actor and indirect fitness benefits to recipients. While this 
is often assumed to be independent of group size, marginal benefits are in 
practice likely to be maximal at intermediate group sizes for many types of 
collective action problems, and will eventually become very small in large 
groups due to the law of decreasing returns. The second component is the 
response of social partners on the past play of an actor, which underlies 
conditional behaviour under repeated social interactions. We argue that under 
realistic conditions on the transmission of information in a population, this 
response on past play decreases rapidly with increasing group size so that 
reciprocity alone (whether direct, indirect, or generalised) cannot sustain 
cooperation in very large groups. The final component is the relatedness 
between actor and recipient, which, according to the rules of inheritance, again 
decreases rapidly with increasing group size. These results explain why helping 
behaviours in very large social groups are limited to cases where the number of 
reproducing individuals is small, as in social insects, or where there are social 
institutions that can promote (possibly through sanctioning) large-scale 
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cooperation, as in human societies. Finally, we discuss how individually devised 
institutions can foster the transition from small-scale to large-scale cooperative 
groups in human evolution. 
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Throughout the biological world, individuals typically have social interactions 
with many other individuals. While obvious examples include mammalian social 
groups and eusocial insect colonies, even microbes secrete extracellular molecules 
that affect the material pay-off of other individuals close to them. Sociobiology 
has long been interested in understanding the evolution and stability of helping 
behaviours, those behaviours that provide a reproductive and/or survival benefit to 
other individuals, potentially at some cost to the actor (e.g. cooperation or 
altruism). Such behaviours are pivotal to social life, from the sterile somatic cells 
in metazoans that form a fortress for germ cells, to the contribution of individuals 
to defensive warfare in human societies. Since an ant colony or a human society 
can comprise interactions among millions of individuals, understanding the origin 
and stability of sociality involves understanding how helping behaviours can be 
evolutionarily stable in a population consisting of very large groups. 
Consider an idealised case of such a population, where individuals interact in 
groups of fixed size N (like the island model of Wright, 1931). What is the 
selection pressure on a helping action that results in a marginal reproductive 
benefit !! to the set of all group neighbours, but involves some fixed marginal 
reproductive cost C to the actor? There are essentially three pathways by which 
this kind of action can be selected for (Sachs et al., 2004; Lehmann & Keller, 
2006; West, Griffin & Gardner, 2007; Bourke 2011; Van Cleve & Akçay, 2014).  
The first pathway is an example of direct benefits, which refers to situations in 
which the helping action ultimately increases the reproduction of the actor itself. 
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In one-shot interactions, an action providing a benefit to group neighbours may 
not only result in some marginal cost to the actor, but also in some marginal 
benefit !! to the actor. The action can then be favoured by selection when this 
benefit outweigh the costs (i.e. the net marginal effect is positive, such that !! − ! > 0). An example of this can occur when a meerkat performs sentinel 
behaviour. Sentinel behaviour carries an opportunity cost (! > 0), while providing 
a benefit to group neighbours (!! > 0). Crucially, sentinel behaviour also directly 
benefits the actor (!! > 0), since the actor will be alerted to an approaching 
predator along with the rest of the group. This benefit to self, however, is likely to 
be greater in smaller groups, since in a small group if the individual does not 
perform sentinel duty then there may be no other group member available to do so, 
leaving the entire group including the actor unprotected.  
The second pathway for the evolution of helping occurs when interactions are 
repeated (multimove interactions). If individuals can condition their behaviour on 
the outcome of past interactions, the marginal benefit !! conferred to others 
during previous play may be reciprocated (either by a recipient of that act of help 
or by another group member). This returned benefit is usually discounted 
according to some factor !!, which captures the responsiveness of others to the 
behaviour of the actor. Where the help given to others is reciprocated, this can 
provide direct benefits that outweigh the marginal cost (i.e. the net marginal effect 
is again positive, such that !!!! − ! > 0). An example of this occurs in vampire 
bats, where a bat that has just had a blood meal may regurgitate some of the blood, 
and donate it to a group member that has been unsuccessful in feeding that night. 
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The donation causes the actor to suffer an immediate loss of food (C), but may 
provide a greater marginal benefit to the recipient, in terms of increasing the time 
until death from starvation (!! > !) (Wilkinson, 1984; Carter & Wilkinson, 
2013). By donating, the actor increases the chances that the recipient will donate 
to the actor in future if the actor fails to feed (!! > 0), and the benefit, discounted 
by the responsiveness of recipients, can outweigh the cost of donation (Carter & 
Wilkinson, 2013). However, responsiveness is likely to decrease with group size, 
since an individual will have to keep track of interactions between (or have 
information about) more and more individuals. 
Finally, since by definition !! affects the reproduction of others, the action of 
an individual can also result in indirect benefits. This then creates the third 
pathway by which helping can be favoured. An actor receives indirect benefits 
from helping other group members if these individuals are more likely themselves 
to be helpers than are individuals sampled at random from the global population. 
This entails that helping preferentially falls on other individuals carrying the 
determinant (or predictor) of the action. This is measured by relatedness, !!, – the 
covariance between the trait of the actor and recipients (possibly scaled to account 
for local competition for resources; e.g. Queller, 1994). Given sufficient 
relatedness, the indirect marginal benefits of helping can outweigh the marginal 
cost (!!!! − ! > 0). An example of this occurs when a honeybee stings an 
intruder to its colony. This results in its own death (! > 0), but also the death of 
the intruder, which provides a marginal benefit to the rest of the colony (!! > 0). 
Since the individuals in a colony are typically highly related (!! ≫ 0), this 
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suicidal helping provides an indirect fitness benefit to the actor, which can more 
than offset the cost, even in the absence of any direct benefit to helping. 
Importantly, relatedness between group members depends crucially upon group 
size. In eusocial colonies such as this, relatedness between workers decreases with 
the number of queens that found the colony, since the probability that two workers 
descend from the same queen decreases with queen number. 
While it is, then, well understood how helping can in principle be favoured by 
selection, we have stressed above that all components of the selective pressures on 
helping in all pathways depend crucially upon group size N, and may actually 
decrease with it. Specifically, the following all depend upon group size: (i) the 
marginal reproductive benefits to self, !!, and to others, !!, (ii) the coefficient of 
responsiveness !!, and (iii) !! the (scaled) coefficient of relatedness. Despite this, 
the effects of group size on the selective pressure in evolutionary models of 
cooperation and altruism are often sidelined. As a result, mechanisms are often 
suggested as supporting large-scale cooperation or altruism, when in fact they 
would rapidly become ineffective with increasing group size. Finally, there is 
often a mismatch between the implicit assumptions of the models concerning the 
effects of group size, as opposed to the actual effects of group size in the empirical 
world.  
Our goal herein is twofold. First, it is to highlight the biological implications of 
assumptions about group size and their effect on the selection pressure in common 
models for the evolution of helping. Second, it is to delineate which mechanisms 
are likely to allow helping to evolve in very large groups. This is crucial to 
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understanding the stability of sociality in general, as group size is perhaps the 
single most important limiting factor for its evolution. Importantly, our analysis 
implies that while social insect colonies are often compared with human societies 
in terms of sociality, the evolutionary mechanisms behind large-scale cooperation 
are in fact fundamentally different in these two cases. 
In order to discuss the effect of group size on selection pressure in a 
quantitative way, we frame the literature on the evolution of helping into the 
simple selective pressures provided above, which can be summarized in a single 
synthetic evolutionary model [see online Supporting information, Appendix S1 for 
a derivation and Sachs et al. (2004); Lehmann & Keller (2006); West et al. 
(2007); Bourke 2011; and Van Cleve & Akçay (2014) for more social evolution 
background on which our analysis builds]. This allows us to cover and discuss the 
role of group size in essentially all standard models of the evolution of cooperation 
and altruism. For example, through the direct benefits pathway we are able to 
cover the effects of group size in one-shot collective action problems, which may 
involve synergistic cooperation, punishment, or other incentive schemes. Through 
the responsiveness pathway, we cover the effects of group size under repeated 
interactions, which may involve direct, indirect, and generalised reciprocity 
(including partner choice and switching). Finally, through the relatedness pathway 
we are able to cover arbitrary spatial structure induced by limited dispersal, 
including patch-, lattice-, and network-structured populations. 
 
II. HOW THE MARGINAL BENEFITS OF HELPING DEPEND ON 
 9 
GROUP SIZE 
We start discussing the role of group size by assuming no responsiveness or 
relatedness between group members (!! = !! = 0). This allows us to isolate the 
effects of group size on the benefits of helping. We consider the simplest case 
where a unit of investment into helping produces a public good that increases the 
number of offspring produced by all group members, which we refer to as group 
productivity, equally. That is, there is no dominance hierarchy or other class 
structure within a group that would create an unequal distribution of the benefits 
of help. This allows us to explore how the benefits of helping change with group 
size in the simplest way. 
The marginal benefit to a focal individual of investing in a unit of help, !!, is 
then its share (1/!) of the increased group productivity that its helping action 
creates. In turn, the marginal benefit to the rest of the group, !!, is equal to (! − 1)!!, since each of the other N−1 group members also receives the same 
benefit (see Appendix S2). How, then, will these marginal effects of helping 
change with group size?  
 
(1) The economics of helping 
Production functions from microeconomics (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2001) provide 
a principled way to address this question. A production function maps factors of 
production into an output product. In our case the factors of production are the 
investment into helping of each individual in the group, as well as other biotic and 
abiotic factors such as space and food. The output product is group productivity. 
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One can then ask: how does production change when a factor of production is 
altered? As in most models of the evolution of helping, we consider the effect of 
varying total investment into helping in the group (sum of the actions of all 
individuals), while holding all of the other biotic and abiotic factors of production 
constant (see Appendix S2 for specific examples).  
The total investment into helping in a group is typically given by group size 
multiplied by the average individual investment into helping of the group 
members. We define the marginal product of helping, !!, as the derivative of 
group productivity with respect to the investment into helping of the average 
group member (equation S10 in Appendix S2). The marginal product !! is key 
because it gives the amount by which group productivity increases as a result of an 
individual’s helping action, when all other factors are held constant. It therefore 
determines both the direct benefit of helping !! (the actor’s share of the marginal 
product, that is; !! = !!/!), and the benefit from helping conferred on the rest 
of the group !! (each other group member’s share of the marginal product, see 
equations S11–S17 in Appendix S2). We are then interested in how the marginal 
product of helping changes with group size.  
Many theoretical models in evolutionary biology (e.g. Williams & Williams, 
1957; Wilson, 1975; Wade, 1979; Nunney, 1985; Taylor, 1992; Boyd et al., 2003; 
Gardner & West, 2006) assume that group productivity increases linearly with the 
total investment into helping by group members (Fig. 1A, solid line). The 
marginal product of helping is then constant for any amount of help, and hence 
across all group sizes (Fig. 1B, solid line). In this case, the marginal direct benefit 
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of helping (!!) will decrease with group size at a rate on the order of 1/! 
(Fig. 1C, solid line). The marginal direct benefit of helping decreases rapidly 
(more formally, hyperbolically) when the marginal product of helping is a 
constant, because as group size increases each unit of help an individual produces 
provides the same increase in group productivity, but this constant amount is 
shared by more individuals. Consequently each individual, including the actor, 
benefits less from a single act of help as group size increases. The marginal benefit 
to the rest of the group (!!) is then a concave function of group size (Fig. 1D, 
solid line). 
This case of a linear production function corresponds to a linear public goods 
game, which is in standard use in behavioural economics experiments on 
cooperation (e.g. Gürerk, Irlenbusch & Rockenbach, 2006; Kosfeld, Okada & 
Riedl, 2009; Putterman, Tyran & Kamei, 2011; Traulsen, Röhl & Milinski, 2012; 
Burton-Chellew & West, 2013). Crucially, however, it is hard to find actual 
empirical cases where group productivity increases linearly with total investment 
into helping. Indeed, it has been argued that constant marginal returns from 
helping never apply in biology (Archetti & Scheuring, 2012). Realistically, the 
benefits of helping must eventually saturate (Fig. 1A, dotted line), such that the 
marginal product of helping starts to decrease (Fig. 1B; dotted line). This is 
because of the fundamental fact that the other factors of production, apart from 
investment into helping, depend on limited resources and so eventually limit group 
productivity. This is known in economics as the law of diminishing marginal 
returns. It is the principle that if only one factor of production is increased, while 
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the others are held constant, then the increase in output from adding another unit 
of that factor will eventually become smaller. Table 1 provides empirically 
demonstrated examples of the law of diminishing marginal returns for various 
biological public goods.  
While there must always be diminishing returns for very large group sizes, 
there are two different cases to consider for small or moderate group sizes. We 
develop these explicitly, and how they affect the marginal benefits !! and !! in 
standard evolutionary game theory models, in Appendix S2. 
In the first case, diminishing returns occur from the onset so that the production 
function is concave in the total investment into helping. This occurs when adding 
a second helper to a group increases group productivity by less than adding the 
first helper did. For example, adding a second sentinel to a group is unlikely to 
double the chances of detecting a predator (Clutton-Brock et al., 1999). Similarly, 
yeast can cooperatively convert sucrose into glucose, but doubling the available 
glucose concentration does not double growth rate. Instead, an empirical study 
found that the growth rate depends on glucose concentration to the power 0.15 
(Gore, Youk & Oudenaarden, 2009), making for a highly concave production 
function. For a concave production function, the marginal benefit !! generally 
decreases very rapidly with group size (Fig. 1C, dotted line), and the selection 
pressure on helping thus follows the same trend. 
The second case is where there is an initial range of group sizes for which 
helping exhibits increasing marginal returns, which applies to many types of 
public good (Table 2). In biology this is commonly referred to as synergy 
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(Sumpter, 2010, chapter 10). In these cases the production function is likely to be 
sigmoidal (Fig. 2A), with an initial range of group sizes over which it is convex. 
The marginal product of helping initially increases with group size (Fig. 2B), but 
then starts to decrease and eventually become zero as the benefits of helping 
saturate. Consequently, !! and !! are both humpback functions of group size 
(Fig. 2C and 2D), with an intermediate group size providing the largest individual 
benefit to investing in helping.  
A common case of increasing marginal returns is where a threshold level of 
investment into a public good must be crossed before that good provides any 
benefit. For example, an attack by a large aggregation of bark beetles is required 
in order to overcome a host conifer’s resin defences (Franceschi et al., 2005). 
Below this threshold, increasing individual investment in helping group mates to 
attack has little effect, since the attack will fail regardless. But as the threshold 
group size is approached, an additional helper can have a large effect. Similarly, 
many microbial public goods only become effective at high cell densities. This is 
because at low cell densities the goods diffuse away before they can be used 
(Darch et al., 2012).  
In ecology, increased direct fitness with respect to group size is known as the 
Allee effect (Allee et al., 1949). An important cause of this is synergistic helping 
(Courchamp, Clutton-Brock & Grenfell, 1999). For example, small colonies of 
Damaraland mole-rats Cryptomys damarensis may fail to locate and share food 
efficiently (Jarvis, Bennett & Spinks, 1998), while studies suggest that African 
wild dogs Lycaeon pictus require a threshold group size for their cooperative 
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hunting strategy to be energetically efficient (Courchamp et al., 1999). Moreover, 
if the direct benefits of helping are to provide an incentive to forming social 
groups, then group productivity must have some initial increasing marginal returns 
(Avilés, 1999). This is because if group productivity increases only linearly with 
investment into helping, then the direct benefit of helping can only decrease with 
group size. Consequently, in the absence of indirect benefits (!! = 0) or 
responsiveness to past behaviour in repeated interactions (!! = 0), individuals 
would be better off as solitaries unless there were increasing marginal returns for 
some range of group sizes. 
Increasing marginal returns also occur in between-group conflicts. For 
example, models of between-group warfare in humans often assume a sigmoidal 
production function (e.g. Bowles, Choi & Hopfensitz, 2003; Bowles, 2009; García 
& van den Bergh, 2011; Lehmann, 2011). Under the common assumption that 
losing groups are completely destroyed and repopulated by members of winning 
groups, this can cause !! to become independent of group size, while !! 
increases with group size (see Appendix S2, Section 2b). These assumptions can 
therefore produce a positive selection pressure for helping even in groups of 
arbitrarily large size (Lehmann, 2011). However, the extent to which these 
assumptions would have been met in human hunter–gatherer groups has been 
debated (for example, compare Bowles, 2009, with Fry & Söderberg, 2013). 
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(2) Direct benefits through enforcement 
So far, we have considered helping traits that evolve because the benefit from the 
actor’s share of the public good it produces outweighs the cost. But direct benefits 
to helping can also arise when helping is enforced through punishment, even when 
the actor receives none of the good that it produces (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 
1995). This happens when the cost of being punished is greater than the cost of 
helping. We can write the cost to an individual of being punished for not helping 
as !!. Not being punished then provides a direct marginal benefit of !! = !! to 
the individual (equal to the cost of being punished), so helping is selected for if !! > !. Punishment can therefore convert helping into a stable equilibrium when 
it otherwise would not be. 
Crucially, for a given level of investment into punishment, !! must decrease 
with the number of non-helpers that need to be punished. Intuitively this is 
because the per capita effect of being punished is likely to be proportional to the 
total investment into punishment, divided by the number of individuals that need 
to be punished. This means that the effect of punishment decreases with group size 
when helpers are rare. In addition, as group size increases then problems arise in 
monitoring the actions of more and more group members (Carpenter, 2007; 
Fischer et al., 2014).  
Despite this, the effects of group size on the efficacy of punishment have been 
glossed over in studies of human pool punishment (Sigmund et al., 2010, 2011; 
Traulsen et al., 2012; Schoenmakers et al., 2014). Under pool punishment each 
individual decides whether to invest resources into a centralised punishment pool, 
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and then decides whether to help or not. The resources in the punishment pool are 
subsequently used to punish each non-helper. In a realistic setting, !! should be 
the total amount in the punishment pool divided by the number of non-helpers. 
However, both theoretical models and experiments on pool punishment have 
concealed this by assuming that each non-helper is punished by the entire contents 
of the pool (Sigmund et al., 2010, 2011; Traulsen et al., 2012; Schoenmakers 
et al., 2014). This assumption means that the only factor that matters is the total 
amount of resources in the punishment pool, and not group size. But in a more 
realistic setting, the number of non-helpers in the group should also matter – the 
greater the number of non-helpers, the less each will be punished by. Explicitly 
taking account of group size in this way makes the models more complicated. 
Nevertheless, realism with respect to group size is important given that pool 
punishment is suggested as an explanation for large-scale human cooperation.  
So far we have discussed the effect of group size on the effect of being 
punished, !!. But group size also effects selection pressure on investment into 
punishment itself. This is because a threshold level of punishment must be reached 
before it pays non-helpers to become helpers (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Lehmann 
et al., 2007). If a group is initially fixed for non-helpers, then a single mutant 
punisher will have little effect. Consequently, individuals that invest into 
punishment must cross a threshold frequency before their investment has any 
effect. While this threshold frequency may stay the same as group size increases, 
an increase in group size means that a larger absolute number of individuals that 
invest into punishment will be needed in order to cross it. The result is that it 
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becomes more difficult for punishment to invade as group size increases. In 
addition, problems of second-order free-riding become greater in larger groups 
(Boyd et al., 2003; Lehmann et al., 2007). This is where individuals that help in 
order to avoid being punished, but that do not themselves invest into punishment, 
become fitter than helpers that do invest into punishment. If punishment and 
helping are not perfectly linked traits, then this can lead to the breakdown of 
sanctioning systems in large groups.  
 
(3) Summary 
Group productivity is often assumed in models of helping to be a linear function 
of the total amount of help. In that case, the direct fitness benefit of helping tends 
to decline rapidly with group size, on the order of 1/!. However, in reality group 
productivity is often likely to be a sigmoidal function of the total amount of help 
(Fig. 2A). As a result, the marginal product of helping (!!) then initially 
increases with group size (Table 2), but must eventually start to decline as group 
size continues to increase, due to the law of decreasing marginal returns. In such 
cases the direct fitness benefits of helping are strongest in intermediate sized 
groups (Fig. 2C). Punishment of non-helpers can also select for helping, even 
when helpers receive none of the benefits of their own helping acts. However, 
realistically the per capita effect of punishment must decrease with the absolute 
number of non-helpers in the group.  
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III. HOW RESPONSIVENESS DEPENDS ON GROUP SIZE 
 
We now turn to consider situations in which individuals engage in repeated (or 
multimove) interactions, so that they can condition actions on the previous actions 
of their partners. In terms of our model, this means that the selection pressure on 
helping takes the form !!!! − ! > 0 (see Appendix S1, we assume that the 
population is not spatially structured and there are no direct benefits, so that !! = !! = 0). Our aim is to make clear how the coefficient of responsiveness !! 
must depend upon group size. 
 
(1) The interdependency of helping 
The coefficient of responsiveness, !!, gives the degree to which other group 
members adjust their action in response to that of the actor in a group of N 
interacting individuals (see Appendix S1). This quantifies the extent to which the 
current partner of a focal individual will change its investment into helping when 
the focal does (this coefficient can also be thought as the regression of a partner’s 
action on the focal’s action; Van Cleve & Akçay 2014). For example, primates 
adjust the amount of time they spend grooming other individuals based on how 
much the recipient has groomed them in the past (Schino & Aureli, 2010). The 
extent to which they adjust this is then captured by !!.  
In general, the coefficient of responsiveness !! must decrease with increasing 
group size. This follows simply from the cognitive demands of tracking the 
behaviour of more and more individuals. Consequently, the evolution of helping 
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through reciprocation becomes less likely as group size increases. As we now 
discuss, this applies to direct, indirect, and generalised forms of reciprocity.  
 
(2) Direct reciprocity 
Under direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), individuals 
are assumed to have interactions with the same partners repeatedly. We consider 
first dyadic social interactions. The coefficient !! then measures the degree to 
which the partner changes its action based on the action of the focal individual 
during their previous interaction. In biologically realistic settings, individuals are 
likely to interact with many partners during their lifetime. This means that a 
memory large enough to store the outcomes of previous personal interactions (and 
monitor more or less noisy signals) with N individuals is required in order for a 
large value of !! to be obtained with each interaction partner (Stevens & Hauser, 
2004; Brosnan, Salwiczek & Bshary, 2010; Connor, 2010; Moreira et al., 2013).  
One line of empirical support that memory size constrains reciprocal helping in 
large groups comes from the fact that social group size covaries positively with the 
size of the neocortex in non-human primates. This suggests that neocortex size 
limits the number of reciprocal relationships that an individual can keep track of 
(Dunbar, 1992). Indeed, the need to track social relationships in larger and more 
complex groups has been argued to be a key driver of the relatively large brains 
seen in primates (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Dunbar, 1998). Yet even with a large 
neocortex size, !! should still be expected to decline rapidly with group size 
under dyadic direct reciprocity. For example, a study has shown that when humans 
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have to remember whether the last actions of 15 group members were cooperative 
or not, they exhibit a high mean error rate of 24% (Stevens et al., 2011). This 
suggests that individuals were having to guess whether half of their group 
members had cooperated or not, even when they had been directly provided with 
this information at an earlier point in time.  
Direct reciprocity can also occur in repeated public goods games. These are 
situations where N individuals simultaneously decide whether to invest in helping 
that will benefit all of them, and this is repeated between the same players for a 
number of times during their life. In such cases, individuals can condition their 
decision to contribute to the public good on how their group members have 
behaved in the past. In this case !! is diluted compared to a pairwise interaction, 
even in the absence of memory constraints. This is because the focal individual 
cannot directly respond to the action of any one individual group member, but 
only to some aggregate of the action of all of the N group members. This diluting 
effect is on the order of 1/!. 
A concrete example of the diluting effect is given by models of the evolution of 
response rules of the form: ‘help if at least x other group members helped in the 
previous round’. When group composition is random, then the only such rule that 
is evolutionarily stable is ‘help if all of the other N−1 group members helped in 
the last round’ (Joshi, 1987; Boyd & Richerson, 1988). However, although this 
rule is stable when common in a population, the conditions for it to invade a 
population of unconditional non-helpers becomes very stringent as group size 
increases. Specifically, the spread of the rule relies on the formation of at least one 
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group where all individuals use it (Boyd & Richerson, 1988), and the probability 
of this happening is very unlikely in groups of even moderate size.  
 
(3) Indirect reciprocity 
In models of indirect reciprocity (Sugden, 1986; Kandori, 1992; Nowak & 
Sigmund, 1998; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006; Roberts, 
2008), individuals are assumed to be repeatedly rematched in a pairwise way with 
partners that they have not interacted with before. Individuals cannot then 
condition their behaviour on how their partner has behaved towards them in the 
past. Instead, individuals are assumed to be able to condition their behaviour on 
some information characterising the behaviour of their current partner towards 
other group members in past interactions (usually called ‘reputation’ or 
‘condition’). 
To highlight the effects of group size in such cases, let us first consider again 
dyadic interactions. The fate of helping then depends upon the extent to which an 
individual accurately knows the reputation of its partner. A simple model of 
indirect reciprocity can be used to make this point. The model considers 
competition between only two strategies: discriminator versus always-defect. The 
discriminator strategy cooperates only with an individual that helped another 
individual in its previous interaction. The always-defect strategy never cooperates. 
A population of discriminators is stable against invasion by always-defect only if 
the probability of correctly knowing whether the partner previously helped another 
individual or not (its reputation) is greater than the cost-to-benefit ratio of helping 
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(Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). We argue that from an empirical point of view, the 
probability of correctly knowing a partner’s reputation should be expected to 
decrease with group size.  
Knowledge of a current partner’s reputation can come from one of two sources: 
either from direct observation of its behaviour in previous interactions with other 
individuals, or through communication (such as gossip) with other group 
members. Clearly, the number of interactions which an individual can directly 
observe is limited, which has a detrimental effect on cooperation in large groups. 
For example, simulations have looked at the case where an interaction can only be 
observed by ten randomly chosen group members. In this case, while helping was 
stable in groups of 20, it became increasingly unstable as group size increased, 
with helping actions becoming vary rare in groups of 100 (Nowak & Sigmund, 
1998). This implies that limits on what can be observed will limit the evolution of 
helping through indirect reciprocity in large groups. Empirical evidence also 
suggests that observing other group members becomes more difficult as group size 
increases (Fox & Guyer, 1977; Kollock, 1998; Alencar, Deoliveirasiqueira & 
Yamamoto, 2008). Moreover, if interactions are dyadic and private, which many 
undoubtedly are, then it is hard to see how they could reliably be observed by a 
third party at all. As such, even assuming that individuals can directly observe the 
dyadic interactions of 10 other group members may be an unrealistic assumption. 
The same problem is likely to apply if knowledge of reputation is spread 
through communication. This is because as group size becomes larger, then the 
reputation of a new partner is likely to have to be passed through a larger chain of 
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individuals to reach the actor. Errors in the communication channel are then likely 
to become greater with every individual in the chain. Moreover, in larger groups a 
chain of individuals linking the partners may not even exist at all. Finally, 
individuals may be dishonest when communicating the reputation of others. Thus 
while experiments have shown that communication can successfully transmit 
reputational information in small groups (Sommerfeld et al., 2007; Sommerfeld, 
Krambeck & Milinski, 2008), on the order of 10 individuals, it is a pressing issue 
for future empirical work to investigate the reliability of communicating 
reputation between individuals in larger groups.  
However, the quality of information received by an individual may actually 
initially increase with group size when groups are small. Evidence for this comes 
from experiments which have shown that individuals tend to discriminate more 
accurately between helpers and non-helpers when they receive multiple gossip 
statements about a partner’s past behaviour (Sommerfeld et al., 2008). In other 
words, receiving reputational information from multiple individuals increased the 
accuracy with which reputations were formed. Intuitively, this is because multiple 
sources of correct information drown out a small number of incorrect ones, and 
indeed individuals tended to believe the majority assessment of whether a partner 
had helped or not in the past (Sommerfeld et al., 2008). This suggests that up to a 
point, the benefits of having multiple information sources in larger groups may 
partly offset the errors created by increased chain length. Nevertheless, this effect 
must eventually tail off in large groups. Moreover, as well as there needing to be a 
chain of individuals to pass along information, psychology experiments also 
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suggest that knowledge of reputation, by either observation or communication, 
requires explicit person memories (Wilkowski & Chai, 2012). This implies that, as 
with direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity is also constrained by memory size in 
large groups.  
Unfortunately, the direct dependence of reputational knowledge on group size 
has often been obscured in models of indirect reciprocity, which assume a constant 
error rate in knowing the reputation of a partner (e.g. Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; 
Roberts, 2008; Nakamura & Masuda, 2011; dos Santos, Rankin & Wedekind, 
2011). This assumption leads to a !! that is constant and thus independent of 
group size, which then implies that indirect reciprocity has no difficultly in scaling 
with group size. Indeed, it has been established long ago that in this case helping 
can be favoured in groups of any size (Kandori, 1992). However, while common, 
the assumption that the responsiveness coefficient is independent of group size is 
not supported empirically. If a per interaction error rate is used, then a more 
plausible assumption would be for it to scale positively with group size. 
The same issues apply in models of biological markets, in which individuals 
can choose their interaction partner based upon the amount of help the potential 
partner offers (Noë & Hammerstein, 1995). For partner choice to favour helping, 
individuals must be able to evaluate the cooperative propensity of a potential 
partner. This may be done by direct, first-hand evaluation of the partner. For 
example, when a plant makes an offer of food to ants in return for the ants 
guarding the plant, this offer of food cannot be retracted by the plant and so serves 
as an honest signal of cooperation (Noë & Hammerstein, 1995). But as group size 
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increases, such direct evaluation between a large number of potential partners 
becomes unfeasible. In such cases individuals must indirectly evaluate the degree 
of help offered by a partner, which then relies on the spread of reputation (André 
& Baumard, 2011), for example through communication (Enquist & Leimar, 
1993). Consequently, biological market models where individuals actively choose 
their interaction partner (instead of being randomly matched) face the same 
problems of the reliable transmission of information. 
If interactions are not pairwise, but instead take place between many 
individuals simultaneously, then the decline of !! with group size under indirect 
reciprocity becomes even more acute. This is because, as with direct reciprocity, 
in a collective action problem an individual can no longer respond to the action of 
any one particular group member. Instead, an individual can only respond to the 
aggregate reputation of the other individuals taking part. This then leads to a rapid 
decline in helping as group size increases, even when the reputation of all group 
members is known perfectly (Suzuki & Akiyama, 2005, 2007, provide explicit 
models of this effect). Combining this effect with reputational errors draws into 
question the prospect of classic indirect reciprocity models providing a 
satisfactory explanation for the evolution of human cooperation in large groups 
(Fowler, 2005). 
 
(4) Generalised reciprocity 
In generalised (or ‘upstream’) reciprocity, individuals are also repeatedly matched 
with new partners from a group of size N. However, unlike indirect reciprocity, 
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they do not use information about the past actions of their new partner. Instead, 
they condition their behaviour towards a new partner based on how their own 
previous partner behaved towards them (Boyd & Richerson, 1989; Pfeiffer et al., 
2005). If an individual was helped during its previous interaction with any group 
member, then it will help the next group member that it interacts with. Conversely, 
if it did not receive help during its last interaction, then the individual will not help 
whichever group member it interacts with next. The idea is that generalised 
reciprocators will establish chains of helping. For example, in the three-individual 
case, individual A helps individual B, in the expectation that individual B will then 
go on to help C, who will in turn help A. By investing in helping, an individual 
thus increases the likelihood that it will be helped in the future by some other 
individual.  
As opposed to both direct and indirect reciprocity, this is cognitively less 
demanding, with individuals only ever needing to remember the outcome of their 
previous interaction, regardless of who that interaction was with. As such, it has 
been argued to apply to a wider range of taxa than indirect reciprocity. For 
example, some experimental evidence has suggested that it occurs in rats (Rutte & 
Taborsky, 2007).  
However, the price of this cognitive simplicity is that for a given group size, !! becomes much more diluted as compared to direct or indirect reciprocity. This 
is because an act of helping has to flow through many other individuals before its 
effects return to the actor. If one individual in the chain does not help after being 
helped, then the original actor’s investment into helping will not make it more 
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likely to receive help itself. In that case, a generalised reciprocator will have paid 
the cost of helping without receiving a benefit in return. This could happen, for 
example, if the group contains an unconditional non-helper, or if a generalised 
reciprocator makes an error. As group size increases, the chain of individuals 
becomes larger before helping returns to the actor, making this breakdown of 
helping more likely. In fact, !! decreases with group size on the order of 1/! in 
this case (Appendix S3; Fig. 3). Because of this, generalized reciprocity can only 
invade in very small groups (Boyd & Richerson, 1989; Pfeiffer et al., 2005), or 
equivalently, in networks created in behavioural time where individuals have only 
a small number of links (Sander & Taborsky, 2012). 
 
(5) Summary 
Under direct reciprocity, !! declines rapidly with group size because of the 
memory constraints of keeping track of the past behaviour of N individuals.  
Under indirect reciprocity, !! must also decline rapidly with group size because of 
the additional problem of obtaining reliable information about the past behaviour 
of N individuals, either by observation or gossip. Under generalised reciprocity, !! again declines rapidly with group size. This is because as group size increases 
then the result of an individual’s previous interaction becomes less informative of 




IV. HOW (SCALED) RELATEDNESS DEPENDS ON GROUP SIZE 
 
Up to this point, we have discussed the role of group size in situations in which 
individuals interact in randomly formed groups of size N, ruling out relatedness 
between interacting individuals. However, most natural populations are not well 
mixed, and so interaction groups are not formed at random in each generation. 
Rather, populations are often viscous such that individuals do not tend to disperse 
far from their parents, creating spatial or family structure. This means that 
individuals with the helping phenotype can tend to interact with others also 
carrying the gene or cultural trait that induces helping, leading to indirect fitness 
benefits. In terms of our model, we now focus on the case where the action is 
selected for when !!!! − ! > 0 (only one-shot interactions occur, see 
Appendix S1), and our aim is to discuss how the coefficient of (scaled) relatedness 
depends on group size. This can be written as 
 !! = !!!! (1) 
where !! is the usual relatedness between patch members (e.g. Rousset, 2004), 
and !! ≤ 1 is a scale factor, which when <1 reduces relatedness. The values of 
both variables depends upon the demographic assumptions of the model 
(Lehmann & Rousset, 2010), and are thus endogenously determined. 
 
(1) The genealogy of helping 
In a group-structured population with a very large number of groups, relatedness 
(!!) can be thought of as the probability that the gene lineages at the helping locus 
in the actor and the recipient coalesce in a common ancestor who lived in that 
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group in some previous generation (see e.g. Rousset, 2004). This in turn depends 
on the probability that over a single generation, the ancestral lineages of the genes 
in actor and recipient descend from the same individual, and will thus be identical-
by-descent. It is a standard result in population genetics that the probability of this 
event is inversely proportional to the (effective) number of reproducing 
individuals in a group, since each such individual could be the common ancestor 
of actor or recipient in the next generation (Ewens, 2004). As such, relatedness 
will decrease rapidly with N (Fig. 4; see Appendix S3, Section 2, for an example 
of how to calculate relatedness).  
A complication is that relatedness, measured in terms of the probability of 
identity-by-descent, must be scaled (or compensated) to take into account the 
effects of local competition (Queller, 1994; Lehmann & Rousset, 2010). This is 
important, because if helping is to spread then the extra offspring that individuals 
receiving help produce must not go on to compete with the actor’s own offspring, 
or those of related group members. Otherwise, the benefits of helping can be 
partially offset (West, Pen & Griffin, 2002), or even completely cancelled out 
(Taylor, 1992; Wilson, Pollock & Dugatkin, 1992). The exact consequence of 
local competition on scaled relatedness !! depends on the precise demographic 
assumptions under scrutiny. But because of the fact that scaled relatedness still 
depends upon the probability of identity-by-descent, it will generally tend to 
decline rapidly with group size (see Table 2 in Lehmann & Rousset, 2010). 
Importantly, relatedness need not necessarily decrease as the absolute number 
of interacting individuals increases, since it depends on the effective number of 
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reproducing individuals. In the case of eusocial insects, relatedness remains more 
or less constant as their colony size expands into the thousands, since all 
individuals are offspring of one or a few queens. That is, the number of 
reproducing individuals, N, remains very small even as group size expands. 
Likewise, microbial colonies can show helping between thousands of individuals, 
but many individuals in the colony will be genetic clones, so the number of 
genetically distinct reproducing individuals is very low (N = 1 if all individuals are 
clones). An analogous situation applies in family-structured populations (Williams 
& Williams, 1957; Wade, 1979). In the classic case a mated female leaves a clutch 
of offspring, who then interact with each other in the nest before they all disperse 
and mate at random in the global population to form the next generation. In this 
case the probability of identity-by-descent, and hence relatedness, is constant in 
the sibling group regardless of the clutch size. 
Finally, although we have not discussed it here, and it does not affect our main 
argument, it is worth noting that in a repeated interaction setting there can be an 
interaction between reciprocal helping and population structure, and that this 
interaction is non-linear (e.g. Van Cleve & Akçay, 2014; see Appendix S1).  
 
(2)  Lattice models and other variations of the baseline group-structured 
model 
The first models of social evolution looked at cases where individuals disperse to a 
random group in the population with some fixed probability (e.g. Eshel, 1972). In 
essence, this is the island model of dispersal (Wright, 1931), which leads to the 
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genealogical interpretation of (scaled) relatedness given above, and to the build up 
of relatedness if dispersal is limited. In this standard model the role of various 
demographic, ecological, environmental, and genetic factors for the selection 
pressure on helping has been analysed in an extensive and consistent analytical 
literature. These analyses demonstrate that scaled relatedness will in general 
decrease with group size (e.g. Aoki, 1982; Taylor, 1992; Taylor & Irwin, 2000; 
Roze & Rousset, 2004; Gardner & West, 2006; Lehmann, Perrin & Rousset, 2006; 
Rousset & Roze, 2007; Johnstone & Cant, 2008; Sozou, 2009; Van Dyken, 2010; 
Ohtsuki, 2010; Gardner, 2010; Bao & Wild, 2012; Rodrigues & Gardner, 2012; 
Kuijper & Johnstone, 2012; Van Dyken & Wade, 2012). It is worth noting here 
that the size of the breeding group (deme) in island models may not be the same as 
the size of the social group in which helping interactions occur. For example, the 
subset of the population with which an individual can exchange help may be 
smaller than the subset of the population with which it can mate (Wilson, 1975). 
In these cases, it is the size of the group in which exchange of help occurs that 
matters. 
Exactly the same concepts apply in models of isolation by distance, where 
space is cartesian (Comins, 1982). Here, relatedness between interacting 
individuals must still depend on the probability of identity-by-descent at the 
helping locus, which again results from coalescence of ancestral gene lineages 
taken in actor and recipients. Consequently, this still decreases rapidly with the 
number of reproducing individuals that contribute to interacting pairs of 
individuals in subsequent generations (Rousset, 2004). Likewise, neighbours from 
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the same or nearby groups are likely to compete locally for resources (Wilson 
et al., 1992) and so relatedness needs to be scaled (!!) in order to assess the net 
selection pressure on an action when dispersal is limited (Taylor, 1992; Queller, 
1994; Lehmann & Rousset, 2010). 
As an example, under iteroparous reproduction modelled by the Moran death–
birth process, with dispersal completely localised to the neighbourhood where 
interactions occur, corresponding to a network or lattice structure, !! = 1/(! −1) (Ohtsuki et al., 2006). This says that for helping to be selectively favoured, the 
benefit-to-cost ratio of helping must exceed the average number of neighbours that 
an individual has. Interestingly, this situation corresponds approximately to the 
island model where dispersal is very low (so that dispersal is in a sense spatially 
localised), in which case !! is asymptotically equal to 1/(! + 1) (equation 11 in 
Mullon & Lehmann, 2014). This displays exactly the same qualitative features but 
is higher because, unlike in a lattice model, dispersing individuals in an infinite 
island model never compete with relatives. This illustrates the well-established 
fact that spatial patterns of dispersal, in which individuals tend to disperse to 
neighbouring patches, are qualitatively well approximated analytically by the 
classic island model where dispersal is to a random patch (Comins, 1982).  
In spatially explicit demographic models of isolation by distance, each site is 
either empty or contains a single individual (e.g. van Baalen & Rand, 1998; 
Le Galliard, Ferrière & Dieckmann, 2003; Lion & van Baalen, 2007; Lion & 
Gandon, 2009). The actual number of neighbours any one individual has is then 
determined endogenously as a result of birth, death, and migration processes, 
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making these models particularly suitable to capture cases where groups arise 
dynamically as a result of feedbacks between evolution, ecology, and 
demography. However, the selection pressure on helping is still affected by 
relatedness and local competition in the same way as discussed above (Rousset & 
Ronce, 2004), where N in our framework can be thought as the upper bound on the 
number of neighbours an individual can exchange help with. 
 
(3) Summary 
Under limited dispersal, the laws of inheritance imply that (scaled) relatedness,  !! , decreases rapidly with group size, on the order of 1/! (Fig. 4). This result 
applies to classic group-structured populations such as Wright’s island model, and 
equally to lattice- and network-structured populations with and without explicit 
demography.  
 
V. ENDOGENOUS GROUP SIZES 
 
So far we have largely discussed group size as if it were an endogenous parameter, 
separate from evolutionary, ecological, and behavioural dynamics. But in practice 
group size is affected by both demography, and by individual decisions about 
whether to join or leave groups or with whom to interact.  
As already alluded to in the last paragraph of Section IV.2, the number of 
neighbours an individual has may depend on local birth and death rates, which in 
turn depend on the level of helping (see e.g. Lion & van Baalen, 2007, for a 
review). Such dependence of birth and death rates is either direct or is mediated 
 34 
through environmental conditions, since the environment can itself be affected by 
the level of helping. For example, helping may allow access to new resources 
(niche expansion), or may allow existing resources to be used more efficiently 
(Wilson, 1987; Lehmann et al., 2006; Powers & Lehmann, 2013). In structured 
populations, the selection pressure on helping traits that increase group carrying 
capacity can be markedly increased when compared to other helping traits that do 
not increase carrying capacity. Essentially, this is because an action that increases 
a group’s carrying capacity increases the representation of the group members’ 
gene lineages in the global population, without simultaneously increasing local 
competition (Lehmann et al., 2006). Consequently, helping that increases carrying 
capacity increases the scaled relatedness, !!, compared to a helping trait that does 
not do so. 
Group size is also often affected by individual decisions to join or leave groups. 
These decisions can be influenced by heritable traits, and can hence evolve. For 
example, group size preference has been shown to be a genetically inherited trait 
in cliff swallows, Petrochelidon pyrrhonota (Brown & Brown, 2000), with 
individuals actively choosing to join colonies of a similar size to their birth 
colony. Similarly, individuals may have genetically encoded strategies to disperse 
once group size becomes too large or too small. It is plausible that a heritable 
group size preference could co-evolve with helping (Avilés, 2002; Avilés, Fletcher 
& Cutter, 2004; van Veelen, García & Avilés, 2010; Powers, Penn & Watson, 
2011). This can even lead to a runaway process where selection results in 
decreased group size, since this increases the indirect benefits of helping, which 
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then further favours a reduction of group size (Powers et al., 2011). Hence, a 
population can evolve from large-group living with little helping, to small groups 
with substantial helping, as for example in the evolution of a reproductive 
bottleneck during the transition to multicellularity (where founding cell groups 
from a single cell makes the effective group size very small; Roze & Michod, 
2001). Likewise, in a situation of repeated interactions, the social network of an 
individual is not necessarily static but may be the result of behavioural dynamics, 
such as when partner-switching and partner choice evolve along with helping (e.g. 
Noë & Hammerstein, 1994; McNamara et al., 2008; Izquierdo, Izquierdo & Vega-
Redondo, 2010; Schwagmeyer, 2014). 
In summary, group size will often be determined endogenously, as a result of a 
coupling between evolutionary, ecological, and behavioural dynamics, and where 
all of these interacting features can sometimes depend directly on the level of 
helping. Crucially though, whenever group size changes endogenously, this will 
not change the qualitative features of the selection pressure on helping, which is 
still affected by !!, !!, !!, and !! in the way that we have described.  
 
VI. LARGE-SCALE HUMAN COOPERATION 
 
For hundreds of thousands of years, early humans adopted a hunter–gatherer 
lifestyle in which they lived and interacted in small groups, where relatedness is 
likely to have been positive and altruistic behaviours towards group members 
plausible (e.g. Bowles 2009). However, the origin of agriculture around 10,000 
years ago produced a demographic expansion that led humans to live in much 
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larger social groups. This ultimately resulted in states comprising millions of 
individuals, where many interactions occur among unrelated individuals.  
We stress that large-scale post-hunter–gatherer human helping involves 
essentially cooperative rather than altruistic behaviour, since altruism is unlikely 
to occur among unrelated individuals (or only maladaptively; Johnson, Stopka & 
Knights, 2003; Trivers, 2004; Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006). We now turn to 
discuss mechanisms of cultural evolution that have been proposed to account for 
the evolution of this large-scale cooperation. In doing so, we will distinguish 
between two hypotheses about what drove this transition: we refer to these as the 
‘biased-cultural-transmission’ hypothesis, and the ‘institutional-path’ hypothesis. 
These hypotheses make very different assumptions about the cognition of 
individuals, especially their abilities to communicate and plan. 
 
(1) The biased-cultural-transmission hypothesis 
Under a variety of decision processes involving the individual and/or social 
learning of behaviours, the learned actions (or strategies) taken by individuals can 
be regarded as replicators, whose dynamics are very similar to those considered in 
population genetics (Börger & Rajiv, 1997; Hopkins, 2002). Treating cultural 
traits as replicators therefore allows methods analogous to population genetics to 
be used to model their evolution (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Lumsden & 
Wilson, 1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985). The idea of the biased-cultural-
transmission hypothesis is that compared to genetic transmission, some of the 
ways in which cultural traits are transmitted between individuals can lead to a 
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greater (cultural) relatedness !! in large groups (Boyd, Richerson & Henrich, 
2011). We will discuss the role of group size for three types of biased-cultural-
transmission modes that have been invoked in cultural transmission models: pay-
off-biased, conformist-biased, and prestige-biased. 
Under pay-off-biased transmission, individuals tend preferentially to imitate 
behaviours of other group members that have produced above-average pay-offs. 
This parallels fitter individuals leaving a greater fraction of offspring in a genetic 
model. Consequently, !! should be expected to scale the same way with group 
size as in a genetic model, i.e. to decrease rapidly with the number of individuals 
that can be imitated. Importantly, local competition tends to be stronger under 
pay-off-biased transmission than under genetic transmission if individuals copy 
the behaviour of others in their group. This means that !! can be equal to zero or 
even be negative in situations where it would be positive under genetic 
transmission (Lehmann, Feldman & Foster, 2008; Mullon & Lehmann, 2014). As 
a result, pay-off-biased transmission is unlikely to help explain the evolution of 
cooperation in groups of a larger size than genetic transmission can support. 
The second type of biased cultural transmission is conformist-biased 
transmission (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich, 2001). In conformist-biased 
transmission, individuals are more likely to imitate the most common behaviour in 
their group. This can create multiple stable equilibria, such that different groups 
will reach different stable frequencies of helping depending upon the initial 
frequency of helping in the group. Conformity can thus help to maintain variation 
between groups, since a new migrant or mutant individual coming into a group 
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will tend to adopt the most common type. If conformity is strong enough, this can 
overcome selection against helping behaviour within groups (Guzman, 
Rodriguezsickert & Rowthorn, 2007; Boyd et al., 2011). In such cases, !! will 
decrease less rapidly with group size, allowing helping to be maintained in larger 
groups, or when groups expand in size.  
There are two issues with this, however. The first concerns the origin of the 
helping trait. Conformist-biased transmission, by its very nature, cannot explain 
the origin of helping when rare in large groups (Lehmann & Feldman, 2008; 
Molleman, Pen & Weissing, 2013a; Molleman, Quiñones & Weissing, 2013b), as 
any rare trait is strongly selected against. Models that use conformist-biased 
transmission must therefore rely on the assumption that at least one group is 
somehow initially fixed for helping behaviour. The second issue is that even if 
helping becomes common in a single group, how can it then spread to other 
groups? This is a problem because conformity will select against helper migrants 
that arrive into non-helper groups. Essentially, if helping is to spread between 
groups under conformist-biased transmission, then groups with fewer helpers need 
to be more prone to extinction. This is because extinction of a whole group 
produces vacant sites that helper migrants can colonise, and so be in the majority 
where conformity will not select against them. One mechanism for this is group 
warfare in which losing groups are driven extinct (e.g. Boyd et al., 2003; García & 
van den Bergh, 2011). Another is if the environment periodically deteriorates, 
causing groups with fewer helpers to become extinct and so leave territory for 
helper groups to expand into (Peck, 2004; Peck & Welch, 2004).  
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But how relevant are these scenarios empirically? While conformity has been 
demonstrated in some laboratory settings, the extent to which it occurs outside of 
these artificial contexts remains an open question. Indeed, while a recent field 
experiment did demonstrate conformity, this effect scaled only weakly with the 
frequency of the behaviour in the group (Claidière, Bowler & Whiten, 2012). In 
fact, work in social psychology has instead tended to support an anti-conformity 
bias, where rare behaviours are likely to be more influential to others in a large 
group (Eriksson & Coultas, 2009). Such an anti-conformity bias has been shown 
theoretically to favour the spread of a rare helping trait (Lehmann & Feldman, 
2008). Overall, this means that while conformity-biased transmission has played 
an important role theoretically, more work is needed to address its empirical 
relevance. 
The last form of biased cultural transmission that we discuss is one-to-many or 
leader transmission (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981), also known as prestige-
biased transmission (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). With this type of social 
learning, all individuals in a group tend to copy the traits of a popular model 
individual, i.e. a leader. If leaders have already gained prestige, and hence are 
already being imitated, then they may be able to introduce a helping trait into their 
group that will spread rapidly, even if the trait would be disadvantageous under 
pay-off-biased transmission. If all individuals copy the trait of the leader, then !! is effectively independent of group size (Lehmann et al., 2008). This can then 
explain both the emergence of helping when rare, and its stability when common 
in large groups.  
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From a purely theoretical and dynamic perspective then, one-to-many 
transmission is the form of biased cultural transmission that is the most likely to 
explain helping in large groups (Lehmann et al., 2008; Molleman et al., 2013b). 
However, empirically it is naive to assume that human group members, who have 
sophisticated cognitive skills, would systematically blindly copy the trait of a 
leader. Indeed, there tend to be marked interpersonal differences in the social 
learning strategies that different individuals use in the same setting (Molleman, 
van den Berg & Weissing, 2014). As such, unlike in the models, individuals are 
unlikely to base their decision to help or not purely on prestige- or conformist-
biased social learning. Rather, they are likely to make some computation based on 
the perceived costs and benefits of helping in a particular environmental context 
(Lamba & Mace, 2011). This decision process will incorporate individual 
learning, as well as various forms of social learning.  
Another major simplifying assumption of the biased-cultural-transmission 
hypothesis (in both models and experiments) is that the choice of actions by group 
members is uncoordinated. That is, each individual decides in isolation whether to 
help or not, whether and who to punish, etc. However, this is a worst-case scenario 
for the evolution of helping. In reality, human social interactions are typically 
constrained and coordinated by pay-off structures (or incentives) that are 
determined by the interacting individuals themselves. Consequently, we now turn 
to discuss the institutional-path hypothesis, and how institution formation can 
drive a transition from small- to large-scale cooperation. 
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(2) The institutional-path hypothesis 
(a) Institutions as mechanisms that generate the rules of the game 
The key idea behind institutions is that individuals are not merely passive 
recipients of their social environment. Rather, they can communicate with each 
other and negotiate the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Greif, 
2006) to create a different pay-off structure (or social organisation) than that given 
by the default environment (Gardner & Ostrom, 1991, p. 127). More formally, an 
institution is a set of possible game forms (Hurwicz, 1996); that is, an institution is 
a (communication) mechanism whose outcomes are rules for social interactions 
(Hurwicz, 1996, p. 128). As an example, an institution could correspond to a 
group deciding to allocate a fraction of its common resources to sanction 
individuals who do not contribute to the production of public goods. The set of all 
possible allocations then corresponds to the set of game forms, as it specifies the 
rules of social interactions. The realised allocation of a group in this example, and 
hence the particular rules of the game, may be decided by various means, such as 
discussion between group members, or imposition by a group leader (Conradt & 
Roper, 2003; Conradt & List, 2009).  
The formation of institutions has long been studied in economics (Ostrom, 
1990; Okada, 1993; Casari & Plott, 2003; Greif, 2006; Ertan, Page & Putterman, 
2009; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Putterman et al., 2011), but has remained outside of the 
scope of the traditional literature on cultural evolution discussed in Section VI.1. 
This is because evolutionary models generally make the simplifying assumption 
that the pay-off structure of social interactions is fixed and outside of individual 
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control. Evolutionary biologists, however, are starting to become interested in 
understanding how institutional rules change the selection pressure on helping 
(Sasaki et al., 2012; Sasaki, 2013; Schoenmakers et al., 2014), and in how the 
individual behavioural traits that create institutional rules themselves evolve 
(van den Bergh & Gowdy, 2009; Safarzyńska & van den Bergh, 2010; Powers & 
Lehmann, 2013).  
Why can institutions encourage helping in large groups? Essentially, 
institutional rules transform the game the individuals play, by changing any of the 
non-genetic components of the selection pressure on helping (!!, !!, !!, or !!). 
As an illustration, one issue that limits impersonal exchange, such as indirect 
reciprocity, in large groups is reliable knowledge of the reputation of other 
individuals. But institutional rules can help to alleviate this by facilitating the 
reliable spread of reputational information. One example of this is if individuals 
that are caught cheating are forced to apologise in public to the rest of the group, 
as happens in modern institutions governing the use of common forests in the 
Himalayas (Ostrom, Gardner & Walker, 1994). Another example is the system of 
the Law Merchant for trade in medieval Europe, where judges adjudicated and 
stored the reputation of international merchants (Milgrom, North & Weingast, 
1990). The implementation of these institutional rules (sensu Hurwicz, 1996) 
shares reputational information about cheaters in an organised way that is not 
dependent upon gossip (and the informational errors that can introduce), and so 
they create a social network structure where past actions can become known to all. 
As a result, they cause the response coefficient !! to decline less severely with 
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group size. Consequently, they change the social environment into one in which it 
pays to help in large groups. 
Likewise, institutional rules can increase the per capita effect of being 
sanctioned for cheating, !!, for a given N. Empirical surveys have shown that 
institutionally coordinated monitoring and sanctioning is fundamental to securing 
cooperation in situations where individuals share a common pool resource, such as 
a forest or fishing water (Gibson, Williams & Ostrom, 2005). In classic peer-
punishment models, !! is limited by the opportunity for second-order free-riding 
(Fowler, 2005), because the game structure is such that each individual must 
unilaterally decide whether or not to invest into sanctioning, at a cost to itself. This 
favours defection in the long run in large groups. One might then wonder, are 
institutions also vulnerable to second-order free-riding?  
Institutional rules that are successful in promoting cooperation take away the 
incentive of second-order free-riding (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994; Greif, 
2006). An example is given by the institutions that manage the use of common 
land in the Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan. This common land 
was potentially vulnerable to exploitation by cheats harvesting too much of a 
communal resource, such as timber (Ostrom, 1990). To prevent this, institutional 
rules were put in place to regulate how much and at what times each household 
was allowed to harvest. The villagers then used a proportion of their common 
resources to hire monitors – individuals that were rewarded for patrolling the 
commons and monitoring rule violations. But why did these monitors not 
themselves cheat by taking payment but then shirking during monitoring, as would 
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be predicted from peer-punishment models? The answer is that they were 
incentivised to monitor actively, by being allowed to take a supply of money and 
saké from any rule violator that they personally found. Similarly, in the building 
and running of the Spanish huerta irrigation systems, monitors were incentivised 
by being permitted to keep a third of any fine imposed on a defector that they 
found (Ostrom, 1990). Successful institutions therefore create individual benefits 
to monitoring and sanctioning, changing the game from one where second-order 
free-riding pays to one where it does not (Ostrom, 1990; Baumard, 2010; Guala, 
2012).  
Crucially, such institutions do not have to be externally imposed but can be 
self-enforcing (Ostrom, 1990; Greif, 2006). Prior work has often thought of 
sanctioning institutions as analogous to modern police forces (e.g. Sigmund et al., 
2010; Sasaki et al., 2012). But individuals can devise rules where sanctioning for 
not complying, and the benefits from helping, are provided endogenously as an 
equilibrium outcome without the need for an external arbiter. This can be achieved 
by individuals having forward-looking preferences over institutional rules 
(Milgrom et al., 1990; Greif, 2006), or by the cultural evolution of preferences for 
specific rules (Powers & Lehmann, 2013). Consequently, sanctioning institutions 
are not inventions of modern societies.  
Since institutions that incentivise cooperative behaviour through coordinated 
sanctioning seem to be universal, understanding their cultural evolution is key to 
explaining large-scale human cooperation. A key question is then how these 
institutions evolved to produce a transition from small- to large-scale cooperative 
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groups with the Neolithic origin of agriculture (see Powers, van Schaik & 
Lehmann, 2016 for further developments of the institutional-path hypothesis). 
 
(b) Demographic transition from small- to large-scale cooperative groups 
 
Provided there are high benefits from helping, institutionally coordinated 
sanctioning can produce a stable equilibrium level of helping in large groups (as 
long as the condition !! > ! holds). But, the problem is that it is difficult for 
individuals that create sanctioning institutions to invade unless group size is small. 
As we have seen, for a given investment into sanctioning, !! decreases with the 
number of non-helpers that must be sanctioned. Consequently, when non-helpers 
are common in a group, it becomes harder for sanctioning institutions to become 
established as group size increases.  
Conversely, it is easier for sanctioning institutions to invade in small groups, 
since a smaller total investment into sanctioning is required to make the condition !! > ! hold. This means that institutions which promote helping may initially 
evolve quite easily in small groups. Crucially, once helping is established in a 
small group, it may lead to demographic expansion that increases group size, for 
instance by producing surplus resources that increase local carrying capacity. A 
concrete example of this is where helping involves contributing to construction 
and maintenance of an irrigation system (Spencer, 1993; Carballo, Roscoe & 
Feinman, 2014). Groups with institutions that allow them successfully to manage 
the collective action problem of irrigation will receive surplus resources and so 
grow to a larger size. 
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Once a sanctioning institution is established in a group, it can maintain helping 
even as the group expands to a much larger size. This is because when helping is 
common, the investment into sanctioning is directed towards only a handful of 
non-helpers. As such, in groups where helping is already common, !! will be 
large even for a large group size. In this way, co-evolution of institutions, helping, 
and demography can produce a coherent transition from small- to large-scale 
cooperation, which overcomes the conundrum of how helping and sanctioning can 
invade into large groups (Powers & Lehmann, 2013). This explanation crucially 
relies on a transient process – the dynamic explicit transition from small-scale to 
large-scale groups, which provides a linkage between behavioural equilibria in 
small and large groups. 
This explanation relies on the empirically plausible assumption that humans 
can communicate and create institutional rules that change the outcome of their 
social actions. However, it does not require conformity, anti-conformity, or 
prestige-biased social learning rules. Instead, individuals need to be forward-




The biased-cultural-transmission hypothesis proposes that simple conformity- or 
prestige-biased learning heuristics select for large-scale human cooperation, since 
they decelerate the decline of cultural relatedness, !!, with group size. However, 
it may be unrealistic to assume that humans cannot reason their way to the fact 
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that cheating or shirking may pay, despite what a leader or other group members 
do. If they can work this out, then they may stop copying the behaviour of the 
leader or the majority, leading to a decline in !! and hence a decline in investment 
into helping. 
The institutional-path hypothesis proposes that the formation of social institutions 
selected for large-scale human cooperation. Institutions can affect any of !!, !!, !!, or !! even under pay-off-biased social learning. This requires a higher level 
of cognition than the biased-cultural-transmission hypothesis, since in order to 
create institutions individuals need to communicate, be innovative, and have 
planning abilities. This fits well, though, with the propensity of humans to have 




(1) Our theoretical analysis alongside the empirical evidence reviewed here 
implies that in most cases, both relatedness (!!) and the responsiveness of other 
group members behaviour to the actor’s own helping (!!) are expected to 
decrease rapidly with increasing group size. The marginal benefits of helping must 
also eventually decrease with increasing group size (Table 1), due to the law of 
diminishing marginal returns. Consequently, both the benefits to self (!!) and to 
other group members (!!) of helping will eventually decrease with group size. 
Together, these provide convincing explanations for why very large cooperative 
groups are relatively rare in nature. Nevertheless they do sometimes occur, for 
example in social insects and human societies.  
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(2) Parallels are often drawn between large-scale helping in social insects and 
humans. However, the mechanisms promoting helping behaviours in these taxa 
are very different. At the risk of oversimplifying, social insect societies essentially 
rely on indirect benefits of helping, driven by high relatedness, while human 
societies essentially have low relatedness and so must rely on direct benefits.  
(3) Humans are capable of creating social institutions that promote cooperation 
through direct benefits. Successful institutions change the social environment to 
one where our predispositions to reciprocity and sanctioning, which are likely to 
have evolved in small groups in our evolutionary past (e.g. Johnson et al., 2003; 
Trivers, 2004; Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006), are still advantageous and can be 
made self-enforcing (Milgrom et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Greif, 2006; Guala, 
2012).  
(4) Both relatedness and institutions are the product of individual heritable 
behavioural traits, and so can themselves evolve by processes of ‘social’ niche 
construction (Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman, 2003; Ryan, Powers & Watson, 
2016). A promising avenue for future theory is to determine the conditions under 
which evolution favours individual behaviours that create high cultural 
relatedness, or cooperation-promoting institutions.  
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Table 1. Empirical examples of cases where helping behaviour has been 
demonstrated to have diminishing marginal returns on group productivity.  
 Example Reference 
 
Reproductive efficiency is reduced in larger groups 
of Hymenoptera. 
Michener (1964) 
 The benefit of extra stalk cells to lift reproductive 
spores in Dictyostelium discoideum is reduced 
once the stalk is high enough to allow dispersal by 
invertebrates or water. 
Huss (1989); Foster (2004) 
 Efficiency of cooperative hunting in social spiders 
decreases beyond a threshold colony size. 
Yip et al. (2008) 
 Group hunting success is a concave function of 
group size in falcons. 
Packer & Ruttan (1988) 
 The growth rate of yeast is a concave function of 
the amount of extracellular invertase enzyme 
produced. 
Gore et al. (2009) 
 Pseudomonas aeruginosa produce less iron-
scavenging molecules per capita at higher cell 
densities. 
Kümmerli et al. (2009) 
 Colony productivity initially increases with queen 
number in Solenopsis invicta, but then decreases as 
further queens are added. 
Tschinkel (1993) 
 One sentinel is often sufficient to alert a group to 
approaching predators. 
Bednekoff (1997); Clutton-Brock 
et al. (1999) 
 Investment in blood sharing gives decreasing 
returns in vampire bat groups. 
Wilkinson (1984); Foster (2004) 
 Human problem-solving ability can increase with 
group size, but adding extra individuals also 
introduces problems of coordination and consensus 
making. 




 Table 2. Empirical examples of cases where helping behaviour is synergistic, 
such that the marginal product of helping increases with group size for small- to 
medium-sized groups. 
 Example Reference 
 
Large aggregations of bark beetles are required to 
overcome conifer resin defences. 
Franceschi et al. (2005) 
 Ant colonies founded by multiple queens are more 
effective at brood raiding. 
Bernasconi & Strassmann (1999) 
 Queen mortality is lower in colonies of Solenopsis 
invicta founded by four queens than one queen, but 
colonies founded by two queens have greater 
mortality than single-queen colonies. 
Adams & Tschinkel (1995) 
 In primates, physical contests are often won by the 
larger of two coalitions. 
Wrangham (1999) 
 Microbial public goods diffuse away too rapidly at 
low cell density, before they can be used. 
Darch et al. (2012) 
 Myxococcus xanthus social bacteria produce no 
spores below a critical density. 
Kadam & Velicer (2006) 
 Protective abilities of biofilms depend upon high 
cell density. 
Cui et al. (2001); Li et al. (2001); 
Høiby et al. (2010) 
 Per-capita food intake increases with pack size in 
cooperatively hunting African wild dogs (Lycaeon 
pictus). 
Creel & Creel (1995) 
 Prey biomass intake per capita increases with 
group size in cooperative social spiders 
(Anelosimus eximius). 
Yip et al. (2008) 
More than five dwarf mongooses (Helogale 
parvula) are required for continuous predator 
vigilance. 
Rasa (1989) 
 Groups of less than four white-winged choughs Heinsohn (1992) 
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(Corcorax melanorhamphos) are incapable of 
cooperative breeding. 
 Predation rate decreases with group size in white-
nosed coatis (Nasua narica). 
Hass & Valenzuela (2002) 
 Net kJ per hunter increases more than linearly 
with group size when Tai chimpanzees hunt 
cooperatively. 
Boesch (1994) 
 Whale hunting in small-scale human groups 
requires cooperation between a minimum number 
of crew members. 
Alvard & Nolin (2002) 
 Human societies with larger initial population 








Fig. 1. Plots of group productivity (A), marginal product of helping !! (B), 
marginal direct benefit !! (C), and marginal benefit to others !! (D), all as a 
function of group size for a public goods game (group productivity is given by 
equation S14 in Appendix S2 with ! = 1− (!")! and ! = 1; the marginal 
product of helping, !!, is given by equation S15; the direct benefit, !!, is given 
by equation S16; and the indirect benefit, !!, is given by equation S17). Solid 
lines display constant marginal returns (! = 1), which represent investment into 
helping in the N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma, and in many behavioural economics 
experiments on public goods production. Consequently, the direct benefit of 
helping decreases rapidly with group size. By contrast, dotted lines display 
diminishing marginal returns (! = 0.5). In that case, the direct benefit decreases 
even more rapidly with group size. 
 
Fig. 2. Same plots as in Fig. 1 except that ! = 1000 in the production function is 
now a constant, where solid lines are for ! = 3 and dotted lines for ! = 4. Group 
productivity is a sigmoidal function of group size, so that the marginal product, 
marginal direct benefit, and the marginal benefit to others are all humpback 
functions of group size. This means that intermediate group sizes are most 
favourable for the evolution of helping. 
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Fig. 3. Plot of the coefficient of responsiveness, !!, with respect to group size 
under generalised reciprocity (equation S22 in Appendix S3). An individual’s 
phenotype, z, is here a linear response slope to the partner’s previous action – the 
marginal change in the focal individual’s investment into cooperation when its 
partner makes a marginal change in their investment. 
 
Fig. 4. Plot of the coefficient of relatedness with respect to group size, in an 
infinite island model with Wright–Fisher reproduction 
(!! as given by equation S24 in Appendix S3). The parameter m here represents 
the migration rate between groups. Relatedness depends on the probability that 
two randomly sampled individuals share gene copies that are identical-by-descent. 
It is a basic result from population genetics that this coalescent probability must 
decrease rapidly with increasing group size, on the order 1/! (see Appendix S3). 
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Appendix S1: A synthetic evolutionary model
We here derive the selection pressures presented in the main text, which are expressed
in terms of the marginal costs (C) and marginal benefits to self (DN ) and other group
members (BN ), and in terms of the coe cient of responsiveness (⇢N ), and the coe cient of
(scaled) relatedness (N ). We use a synthetic evolutionary model that is fully detailed in
Van Cleve & Akc¸ay (2014). We consider a group-structured population of constant and very
large size, which is homogeneous and without class structure (e.g. there are no dominance
hierarchies or age or class structure), but that can otherwise have an arbitrary spatial
structure (e.g. family structure, group structure, lattice model). The main assumption about
social interactions is that the expected number of o↵spring produced by a focal individual,
fN , which performs a stationary level of helping af, depends on the stationary level of helping
aj of its j = 1, 2..., N   1 symmetric social partners and can be written as
fN (af, a1, ..., aN 1). (S1)
This can be thought as a long-term average pay-o↵ (after many interactions have taken place,
see Van Cleve & Akc¸ay, 2014). We assume throughout for simplicity that all functions
are continuous and di↵erentiable, and use the subscript N to emphasise the functional
dependence of fecundity on interacting group size N [an alternative interpretation of the
model is that all forthcoming derivatives are replaced by regression coe cients (McGlothin
et al., 2010), in which case neither continuity nor weak selection is required]. With this, the
partial derivative @fN/@af represents the change in pay-o↵ to the focal individual stemming
from it changing its own level of helping by an infinitesimal amount (marginal change).
Because of the fact that its N   1 partners are symmetric, the e↵ect of any such partner
on the focal’s pay-o↵ resulting from a change in behaviour is @fN/@aN 1 (i.e. @fN/@aj are
equal for all j = 1, 2, ..., N   1 since fN is invariant under permutation of the actions of
neighbours).
We assume that increasing the level of helping results in some cost to the focal individual,
2
but can also generate some benefits that may depend on group size, and so set
@fN
@af
= DN   C, (S2)
where C is the fixed cost of helping, and DN is the benefit that may depend in a complex
way on interacting individuals’ actions. We also denote the total marginal benefit conferred
by partners as
(N   1) @fN
@aN 1
= BN . (S3)
Actions themselves are assumed to be under the indirect control of an evolving phenotype
(see fig. 1 in Van Cleve & Akc¸ay, 2014) and we write af(zf, z1, ..., zN 1) and aj(zf, z1, ..., zN 1),
where zf is the phenotype of the focal individual and zj its value in partner j. With this,








which can be thought of as a measure of the extent to which the actions of its partners change
when the focal changes its own action (see Van Cleve & Akc¸ay, 2014 for more details). Using
this definition and equations S2–S3, it then follows directly from equation 7 of Van Cleve &
Akc¸ay, 2014 that a mutant with a small phenotypic deviation from a resident value z (weak
selection) will be selected for in the resident population when
(DN   C) + ⇢NBN + N [⇢N (N   1) (DN   C) +BN (1 + ⇢N{N   2})] > 0, (S5)
where all terms are evaluated at the phenotypic value z of the resident population, and N is
a demographically scaled relatedness coe cient (Queller, 1994; Lehmann & Rousset, 2010;
Van Cleve & Akc¸ay, 2014).
This selection pressure (equation S5) captures three pathways to helping behaviour: (i)
when ⇢N = N = 0, it reduces to DN   C > 0, (ii) when ⇢N = DN = 0, we recover
NBN  C > 0, and (iii) when N = DN = 0, we have ⇢NBN  C > 0. These are the three
invasion conditions in the main text. More generally, equation S5 shows that there can be
interactions between reciprocity and spatial or family structure when both ⇢N and N are
non-zero (when N = 2, equation S5 is analogous to equation 5 of Lehmann & Keller 2006).
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Appendix S2: Marginal returns of helping
(1) Group productivity
Here, we express the marginal costs, C, and benefits, DN and BN , in terms of marginal
changes to group productivity. To that end, we write group productivity as g(af, a1, ..., aN 1)
and assume that this function is invariant under the permutation of the actions of all group
members (i.e. @fN/@af = @fN/@aj are equal for all j = 1, 2, ..., N , and consequently
@g/@af = @g/@aj are equal for all j = 1, 2, ..., N). Because we assume that group members
are undi↵erentiated, then it is standard to assume that each group member receives an equal
share of the productivity of its group (e.g. Williams & Williams, 1957; Wilson, 1975; Wade,
1979; Nunney, 1985; Taylor, 1992; Boyd et al., 2003; Gardner & West, 2006). We can then
write the fecundity of the focal individual as
fN (af, a1, ..., aN 1) =
g(af, a1, ..., aN 1)
N
  Caf. (S6)





· @g(af, a1, ..., aN 1)
@af
, (S7)
and where all derivatives throughout are evaluated at af = a1 = ... = aN 1 = a. This is the
actor’s share of the marginal increase in group productivity that its investment into helping
produces. Similarly, from equation S3 and the permutation invariance of group productivity,





· @g(af, a1, ..., aN 1)
@af
(S8)
= (N   1)DN .
We will now consider explicit examples of the group production function, and for simplic-
ity we make a standard assumption that this function depends only on the total investment
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into helping of all group members (Sumpter, 2010, chapter 10), which we can write as a¯N ,







According to this assumption g(af, a1, ..., aN 1) = g (a¯N). Note that we can graph group
productivity as a function of N by taking a¯ as a constant. We define the marginal product





that is, how group productivity changes with respect to the investment into helping of the






(2) Contest success functions
A general way to model how group productivity changes with respect to total investment into
helping a¯N , and hence with group size, is to use the concept of a contest success function
(Hirshleifer, 1989). This models a “contest” between the individuals in the focal group
against another entity. We can consider two types of contest: a contest against “nature” or
the environment, and a contest against another group of individuals. We will consider both
in turn.
(a) Contests against nature
Although a contest success function can take several forms, one type commonly used in
economics is the additive form (Skaperdas, 1996), in which the amount of resource obtained
(or the probability of obtaining the resource) depends upon the relative strength of both
entities involved in the contest (Hirshleifer, 1989). This gives the following production
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function for group productivity when the contest is against nature
g (a¯N) =
F (a¯N)
F (a¯N) +  
, (S12)
where the function F maps investment into helping of group members into “strength” (or
ability to solve a problem) and   is the strength of the environment. That is, it controls
how much total investment into helping is required to reach a given group productivity,
and so represents the degree of hostility of the environment. Substituting equation S12











To evaluate the marginal product explicitly we need an explicit expression for F . A standard
form for the contest success function is to take F (x) = x  , where the parameter   measures
the decisiveness of increasing investment into helping in “defeating” the environment (Hir-





The marginal product of helping, evaluated at af = a1 = ... = aN 1 = a¯ = a, is given by











A necessary condition for this to increase with group size is that   > 2. This means that
there must be a range where group productivity increases by more than the square of total
investment into helping. The marginal benefit given to other group members from helping,
BN , evaluated at af = a1 = ... = aN 1 = a¯ = a, is given by substitution into equation S8:
BN =




For   = 1   (aN)  , the production function reduces to g(aN) = (aN)  . Then if   = 1,
production is linear with investment into helping across all group sizes (Fig. 1A), in which
case DN (Fig. 1C) corresponds to the selection pressure on helping under a linear public
goods game or N -player Prisoner’s Dilemma. If   < 1, the production function increases
less than linearly (the production function is concave), and so displays decreasing marginal
returns across all group sizes (Fig. 1). This produces results that correspond to an N -player
Snowdrift game [although in the classic formulation of the Snowdrift game it is the cost
rather than the benefit function that decreases with total investment into helping (Zheng
et al., 2007), but both cases can produce a coexistence of helpers and non-helpers Archetti
& Scheuring, 2012)]. Finally, if   > 1 then group productivity continues to increase with
investment into helping without limit, such that there are increasing marginal returns across
all group sizes. This results in two stable equilibria, with either zero or full investment
into helping (Motro, 1991). However, because of the law of diminishing marginal returns,
unbounded increasing returns is not biologically plausible.
When   > 0 and   > 1, the production function can take sigmoidal shapes (Fig. 2A).
Situations where the marginal returns of helping follow a sigmoidal function as given in
equation S12 have been modelled as a Volunteer’s Dilemma game (Motro, 1991; Archetti &
Scheuring, 2011). In the most basic version of this model, a threshold number of helpers are
required in order to produce any benefit, but once produced this benefit does not increase
with the addition of extra helpers. This can lead to a stable coexistence of helpers and non-
helpers. However, sigmoidal benefits can make the invasion of helping more di cult, since a
certain number of helpers must be present before direct benefits select for helping, i.e. before
DN   C > 0 is satisfied (compare Fig. 2C with Fig. 1C). This same threshold problem is
also faced by the origin of punishment, or by the origin of helping under conformity-biased
social learning in cultural evolution models.
7
(b) Contests against other groups
We can obtain from equation S12 a contest success function that gives the probability that
the focal group wins a war against another group by setting the strength of environment to
  = F (Na¯o) , (S18)
where a¯o is the average investment into helping by individuals of the other group (assumed
to be of the same size). In this case, F maps investment into helping into combat strength,
i.e., it increases a group’s chances of winning the contest, and relative combat strength
determines group productivity.
One could use as before F (x) = x  , which when substituted into equations S12–S18
means that the probability of winning the war depends upon the ratio of the two groups’
investments into helping. Another form is F (x) = exp ( x), so that contest success depends
upon the di↵erence between the groups’ investments into helping (Hirshleifer, 1989; Cant,
2012). This results in increasing marginal returns right up until the point that both groups
invest equally, and means that a small increase in investment into helping can produce a
large increase in the probability of victory.
If the losing group is completely destroyed and repopulated by the winning group and all
group members contribute equally to this repopulation (as per e.g. Boyd et al., 2003; Bowles,
Choi & Hopfensitz, 2003; Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Choi & Bowles, 2007; Lehmann, Feldman
& Foster, 2008; Garc´ıa & van den Bergh, 2011; Lehmann, 2011), then an individual’s share
of group productivity may become independent of N . This is because the losing group
e↵ectively yields N breeding slots to the winning group. Consequently, the fecundity of
an individual is given by fN (af, a1, ..., aN 1) = g(af, a1, ..., aN 1)  Caf (instead of g being
divided by N as in equation S6). An alternative scenario is that the losing group cedes a
proportion of its resources to the winning group, in which case an individual’s share of this
resource will decrease with the size of its group, giving the fecundity function in equation S6.
We can compute the benefits to helping in these four cases by calculating @fN/@af (by
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using equation S18 in equation S12 and evaluating the derivatives at af = a1 = ... = aN 1 =
a¯o = a). Under the ratio form with whole-group replacement, then DN is proportional to
1/N [and BN to (N   1)/N ], while without whole-group replacement DN is proportional
to 1/N2 [and BN to (N   1)/N2]. However, under the di↵erence form with whole-group
replacement, we have DN =  /4, which is a constant [while BN = (N   1) /4]. This means
that the direct benefit of helping is independent of group size in such a case, and so helping
can potentially evolve in very large groups (Lehmann, 2011). On the other hand, under the
di↵erence form without whole-group replacement, the direct benefit is proportional to 1/N
and so rapidly decreases with group size.
Appendix S3: Assortation coe cients
We here exemplify how both the response coe cient ⇢N , and the relatedness coe cient rN ,
decrease hyperbolically with group size.
(1) Responsiveness under generalised reciprocity
Generalised reciprocity is the least cognitively demanding form of reciprocity, since individ-
uals condition their behaviour only on what happened to them in their previous interaction,
without regard to who that interaction was with. Nevertheless, even in this case the re-
sponsiveness of individuals must decrease with group size. This in turn means that selection
pressure favouring reciprocal helping must decrease with group size, even in this most sim-
plest form of reciprocity.
To see this, we can consider the following simple model of generalised reciprocity, which
is a particular instance of the general model described in Appendix S1. Individuals have an
evolving phenotypic trait, z, which represents the gradient of a linear response slope to their
partner’s action. We consider invasion of a focal mutant individual with rare phenotype
zf into a population monomorphic for phenotype zn. Individuals live in randomly formed
9
groups of size N . We write fecundity at the equilibrium of the behavioural dynamics as
f(zf , zn) = 1 +Ban   Caf , (S19)
where af is the equilibrium investment into helping of the mutant focal individual, and an
the equilibrium investment into helping of its partner. The helping actions of generalised
reciprocators are determined as follows
af(h+ 1) = ↵+ zfan(h), (S20)
an(h+ 1) = ↵+ zn
✓
1





where h = 1, 2, 3, ... is the number of rounds of interactions, ↵ is a constant baseline invest-
ment into helping, and where we solve for the equilibrium to substitute into equation S19.












(Van Cleve & Akc¸ay, 2014). Computing the last derivative by using the steady solution of
equation S20 for the actions, which we evaluate at zf = zn = z, yields
⇢N =
z
N(1  z) + 2z   1 . (S22)
This thus decreases very rapidly with group size under generalised reciprocity (Fig. 3), and
is positive only if z > 0. For example, if z = 0.5, then in a group of size two an individual
will return half the investment of its partner. However, if the group size increases to 20 then
an individual will return only one twentieth of it. This occurs because the benefit of an act of
helping has to pass through a chain of recipients to return to the actor, and the length of this
chain is proportional to group size. The conclusion is that although generalised reciprocity
escapes the cognitive demands of other forms of reciprocity, the selection pressure favouring
reciprocal helping nevertheless decreases rapidly with group size.
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(2) Relatedness under limited dispersal
Relatedness measures the e↵ect of limited dispersal (which can arise from spatial or network
structure, for example) on genetic variance. It is calculated from the probability that a pair
of genes sampled from two di↵erent individuals in a subpopulation are identical by descent.
Here, we show how to perform this calculation in Wright’s infinite island model (Wright,
1931). The principles, however, apply to all other forms of population structure, and to
other life cycles, such as those with overlapping generations.
Consider a population of haploid individuals that live in an infinite number of discrete
groups of size N . Each adult asexually produces a very large number of juveniles. Each
juvenile remains philopatric with probability 1  m, or disperses to a random group with
probability m. After dispersal, N juveniles in each group, chosen at random, survive to
adulthood and reproduce, completing the life cycle.
We can calculate the probability that two gene copies, sampled from a random pair of
individuals in a group, are identical by descent. In other words, the probability that two
randomly sampled gene lineages share a common ancestor in the same group (coalesce). The
probability that the genes of two randomly sampled adults descend from a common ancestor
in the previous generation, i.e. that the individuals have the same parent, depends upon two
factors. The first is that it is necessary that both adults are philopatric, i.e. that they were
both born in the same group. This is because as the number of groups become large, then
the probability that an immigrant and a philopatric individual (or two immigrants) descend
from the same parent tends to zero. Therefore, both individuals must be philopatric if the
probability of them descending from the same parent is to be non-negligible.
The second factor that determines the probability of identity-by-descent is the number
of possible parents in the group in the previous generation. This is given by the group size,
N . The larger the number of possible parents, the less likely that two philopatric individuals
in the group will share the same one. In fact, the probability that two individuals descend
from the same parent is 1/N . This means that the probability that the gene lineages of two
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individuals coalesce in an ancestor in the previous generation decreases hyperbolically with
group size.
These two factors, probability of philopatry and group size, determine the probability
that the gene copies in two randomly chosen individuals descend from the same parent
in the previous generation. If they do not descend from the same parent, then they may
nevertheless share a common ancestor in a previous generation. We can therefore apply
the same logic backwards through the generations, leading to the following recursion for
relatedness:












The term (1 m)2 is the probability that the two individuals are both philopatric. They must
both be philopatric if they are to share a common ancestor back through the generations.
Given that they are both philopatric, the probability that they share a common ancestor
directly in the previous generation is 1/N . If they do not, which occurs with probability 
1  1N
 
, then the probability they share a common ancestor in the generation before this
(i.e. two generations ago) is given by rN (t).
We can solve this recursion for rN (t+1) = rN (t) = rN to give the following equation for
relatedness at steady state:
rN =
(1 m)2
1 +m(2 m)(N   1) . (S24)
This shows that relatedness decreases with both group size and migration rate. Although this
example is specific it illustrates a very general feature that follows from the laws of genetic
inheritance (Rousset, 2004), which in turn entails that the scaled relatedness coe cient N
generally decreases very rapidly with group size (see Table 2 in Lehmann & Rousset, 2010).
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